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In Search of the Middle-Ground: Protecting
the Existing Rights of Prior Purchasers in
Common Interest Communities
Terrell R. Lee*
I.

Introduction

During the last half-century, private residential communities
governed by homeowners associations ("HOAs") have rapidly
proliferated, becoming the fastest growing form of housing in the United

States.' Unfortunately, there continues to be widespread disagreement
among courts, legislatures, and association members concerning the
administration of these common interest communities, including the
degree to which an HOA's authority should be limited.'
Many
jurisdictions have afforded the governing boards of these communities

considerable discretion, recognizing common interest communities as
private regimes by which community members have consented to be
governed.3 However, some legal theorists have questioned whether
participation in a common interest community is entirely voluntary.4
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University (2007).
1. Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle Common,
23 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 24 (1995).
2. Compare, e.g., Breene v. Plaza Tower Ass'n, 310 N.W.2d 730, 734 (N.D. 1981)
(holding that restrictions subsequently adopted by the HOA are not enforceable against
prior purchasers) with Apple II Condo. Ass'n v. Worth Bank & Trust Co., 659 N.E.2d 93,
97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that "[iun the absence of a provision either in the
Amendment or in the original Declaration, condominium owners do not have vested
rights in the status quo ante.").
3. See, e.g., Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317,
1320 (N.Y. 1990); David C. Drewes, Putting the "Community" Back in Common Interest
Communities: A Proposalfor Participation-EnhancingProceduralReview, 101 COLUM.
L. REv. 314, 317 (2001).
4. See Gregory Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 883, 901-02 (1988) (discussing the "coercive nature" of membership in
a homeowners association); see also Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associations,
99 HARV. L. REV. 472, 481-83 (1985) (noting that a popular objection to consent theories
is the argument that "neither individuals nor a community can legitimately consent to
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Since available housing options are limited, they argue, some home
buyers may submit to HOA
authority by necessity instead of through
5
"fully informed choice."
Much of the debate concerning common interest communities has
centered on the standards that govern judicial review of a community's
covenants and restrictions. 6 This Comment, however, focuses primarily
on inequities arising from enactments adopted subsequent to a
homeowner's purchase.
Part I examines the development and
proliferation of common interest communities, as well as the
implementation of standards for judicial review of a community's
covenants, conditions, and regulations.
Part III analyzes various
statutory and common law approaches involving restrictions and
covenants enacted subsequent to a community's original declaration,
focusing particularly on their impact on prior purchasers. Part IV
concludes by urging courts and legislatures to limit the enforceability of
covenants and restrictions against prior purchasers and to resolve
ambiguities in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property.
II.

Historical Background

A. Creationof Common Interest Communities
Common interest communities are real estate developments in
which individually owned units are burdened by servitudes, usually
referred to as covenants, conditions, and regulations ("CC&Rs").7 These
communities include planned unit developments, condominiums, and
housing cooperatives of all sizes. s A common interest community is
enslave themselves and that the abandonment of certain basic civil rights constitutes selfenslavement").
5. Wayne S. Hyatt, Symposium: Common Interest Communities: Evolution and
Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 312 (1998); see also Note, The Rule of Law in
Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472, 481-82 (1985). As the popularity and
acceptance of common interest communities becomes more widespread, and alternative
forms of housing more scarce, this argument may develop even greater significance.
6. Compare Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Cal.
1994) (adopting reasonableness standard) with Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment
Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1318 (N.Y. 1990) (adopting the business judgment standard).
7. Drewes, supra note 3, at 316; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES

§ 6.2 (2000).

8. The four primary forms of common interest communities are condominiums,
planned housing developments, stock cooperatives, and community apartments. EVAN
MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSocLATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 126 (1994). Although there are distinctions between the various

types of common interest communities, this Comment does not distinguish between
them.
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established through
a governing document known as a "declaration" or
"master deed," 9 which contains the "plan of development and ownership,
the proposed method of operation, and the rights and responsibilities of
owners within the association." ' 0 The declaration may also empower the
community's governing board to modify, change, or adopt new CC&Rs
by amending the community's original declaration."1 In this way, an
HOA board acts as a mini-government,
serving the individual property
12
owners within the community.
Proponents of common interest communities have recognized
several advantages to their operation. For example, members of these
communities can help maintain high property values 13 through the
implementation of use restrictions, 14 such as prohibitions on leasing 15 or
pets. 16 Members of a common interest community may also be afforded
the use of swimming pools, tennis courts, or other amenities which 17might
ordinarily be too expensive to purchase or maintain by themselves.
Despite these advantages, common interest communities have been
criticized for a number of shortcomings. For instance, some have
derided these communities for their failure to promote a sense of
community among their residents. 18 Others have criticized common
interest communities for their exclusive character, recognizing their
growth as an indication of the widening schism between socio-economic

9. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1278 n.1
(Cal. 1994).
10. Paula A. Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review and
Review of Standards, 3 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 663, 672 (2000) (quoting Wayne S.
Hyatt, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION LAW § 1.05 (b)(3) (2d ed. 1988)).
11. See Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Ass'n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1232-33
(Cal. 2004) (affording amendments the same judicial deference as covenants and
restrictions found in the original declaration).
12. Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1320 (N.Y.
1990).
13. See Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1282 (noting that a significant factor contributing to
the popularity of common interest communities is the "ability of homeowners to enforce
restrictive CC&R's against other owners (including future purchasers) of project units").
For example, a community may impose a requirement that houses within the community
adhere to a designed color scheme. Because the property owners are prohibited from
painting their houses bright pink with purple polka dots, community owners can rest
assured that their property values will not be lowered by a creative neighbor with the
desire for self expression.
14. Drewes, supra note 3, at 322.
15. See, e.g., Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass'n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 459-60 (Fla.
2002) (upholding restriction on leasing).
16. See Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1277 (upholding pet restriction as reasonable).
17. Drewes, supra note 3, at 322.
18. Paula A. Franzese, Does it take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of
Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553, 571-72 (2002).
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classes and the polarization of society.1 9
Critics have also characterized common interest communities as
inflexible and overly restrictive.20 This is due, in part, to the nature of
community association law itself. Attorneys and property managers
routinely advise HOA board members to aggressively and uniformly
enforce CC&Rs to avoid setting a precedent which might bar future
enforcement.2 1 In addition, failure to enforce the rules can place board
members in jeopardy of being sued for breach of a fiduciary duty to the
HOA. 2 On the other hand, a lack of flexibility can lead to resentment
and hostility by community members, which may also result in
litigation.23 HOA board members thus find themselves between the
proverbial rock and a hard place, for which courts and legislatures
struggle to find the appropriate middle-ground.
B. Standardsfor JudicialReview of CC&Rs
As courts have faced litigation between property owners and HOA
governing boards, they have frequently been asked to determine the
standards by which an HOA's rules and regulations should be
reviewed.2 4 This issue has been a hotbed of litigation and scholarly
commentary, from which two basic standards have emerged.
1.

Business Judgment Rule

The business judgment rule prohibits judicial inquiry into actions
"taken in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful
and legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes. 25 Although this rule
19. See Drewes, supra note 3, at 322; see also McKenzie, supra note 8, at 186-87
(noting the potential for social division and conflict arising from the "privatization for the
few"); Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6
(Magazine), at 16 (discussing the quiet secession of the rich from traditional communities
and cities); David J. Kennedy, Note, ResidentialAssociations as State Actors: Regulating
the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 763 (1995)
(indicating harms imposed on society by common interest communities).
20. Hyatt, supra note 5, at 314.
21. Id. at 314; see also McKenzie, supra note 8, at 130-32 (discussing various
reasons HOA board members strictly enforce CC&Rs, including advice by legal
practitioners and a desire to wield power over their neighbors).
22. McKenzie, supra note 8, at 131; see also Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v.
Knuppe Dev., 171 Cal. Rptr. 334, 343-44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that directors of a
common interest community owe a fiduciary to their members).
23. McKenzie, supra note 8, at 131.
24. See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Cal.
1994); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
25. Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (N.Y.
1990) (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979)).
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has generally been applied to shareholder derivative actions, 26 some
courts have used it to evaluate the actions of HOA boards,27 recognizing
the similarities between common interest communities and
corporations.28 The business judgment rule generally requires board
members or directors to perform their duties "in a manner such director
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders
and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily29prudent
person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. ,
The New York Court of Appeals adopted the business judgment
rule in Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp.30 This oft-cited
case involved a dispute between a proprietary lessee and a co-op board
concerning renovations to the lessee's apartment. 3' A provision in the
lease provided that no alteration or addition could be made to the water,
gas or steam risers or pipes without the co-op board's prior written
consent. 3 ' Although the co-op board authorized the lessee's remodeling
plans, the board denied permission to move the steam riser in his
kitchen.33 Notwithstanding this prohibition, the lessee had the kitchen
steam riser moved and eventually filed suit against the board.34 In
response, the board cross-petitioned the court to compel the lessee to
return the steam riser to its original location.3 5 Applying the business
judgment rule, the court of appeals found in favor of the co-op board,
concluding that "the responsibility for business judgments must rest with
the corporate directors; their individual capabilities and experience
peculiarly qualify them for the discharge of that responsibility. 3 6
Although the business judgment rule protects HOA boards from
excessive judicial interference, it limits the ability of community
members to combat arbitrary or unreasonable restrictions on the personal
26. Franzese, supra note 10, at 676 (quoting Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 1325
(Titone, J., concurring)).
27. Franzese, supra note 10, at 676; see also Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condos., 401
A.2d 280, 285-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979); In re Croton River Club, Inc. v. Half
Moon Bay Homeowners Ass'n, 52 F.3d 41, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1995).
28. Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 1321. The court justified its application of a doctrine
similar to the business judgment rule, noting: "Application of a similar doctrine is
appropriate because a cooperative corporation is-in fact and function-a corporation,
acting through the management of its board of directors, and subject to the Business
Corporation Law." Id.
29. McKenzie, supra note 8, at 130 (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (1990)).
30. Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 1317.
31. Id. at 1319.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 1322 (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994,
1000 (N.Y. 1979)).
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use of property. 37 By focusing on the similarities between a common
interest community and a corporation, the business judgment rule
overlooks some of the risks associated with an HOA's quasigovernmental functions, such as "arbitrary and malicious decisionmaking, favoritism, discrimination and the like. 38 Recognizing this
disparity, a growing number of jurisdictions have rejected the business
39
judgment doctrine, adopting instead a standard of "reasonableness.,
2.

The Reasonableness Standard

Under the reasonableness standard, CC&Rs and HOA board
decisions must be "reasonable" to withstand judicial scrutiny. 40 An early
formulation of this test was established in Hidden HarbourEstates, Inc.
v. Norman,4 1 in which the Court of Appeals of Florida held:
[A homeowner's] association is not at liberty to adopt arbitrary or
capricious rules bearing no relationship to the health, happiness and
enjoyment of life of the various unit owners. On the contrary, we
believe the test is reasonableness. If a rule is reasonable, the
association can adopt it; if not, it cannot. It is not necessary that
conduct be so offensive
as to constitute a nuisance in order to justify
42
regulation thereof.
Although application of this standard varies from state to state, four
basic areas of HOA governance are generally examined.4 3 The first
inquiry is "whether or not the action taken or proposed to be taken is
reasonably related to the association's purposes. Next, is the action
reasonably related to or within the association's powers? Third, is it
reasonable in scope, and finally, has it been reasonably enacted or
44
reasonably enforced?",
Several states have adopted some form of the reasonableness

37. Carl B. Kress, Beyond Nahrstedt: Reviewing Restrictions Governing Life in a
Property Owner Association, 42 UCLA L. REv. 837, 868 (1995); see also Randolph C.
Gwirtzman, An Exception to the Levandusky Business Judgment Rule: Owner and
Shareholder Interests in Condominium and Cooperative Board Decisions, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1021, 1041-44 (1993) (contending that the business judgment rule does not
sufficiently protect individual rights of community members).
38. Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 1320.
39. See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Cal.
1994); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
40. See Norman, 309 So. 2d at 182.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Hyatt, supra note 10, at § 6.02 (a)(3).
44. Id.
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standard, either through common law or by statute. 45 One of the more
notable and oft-cited discussions concerning the reasonableness doctrine
is found in Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Association,
Inc.,46 a case decided by the Supreme Court of California. The
controversy in that case centered on a restriction against pets which was
contained in a condominium project's original declaration.47 The
condominium owner asserted that the restriction was "'unreasonable' as
applied to her because she kept her three cats indoors and because her
cats were 'noiseless' and 'created no nuisance."', 48 The court rejected
this argument, finding that "the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a
condominium use restriction ...is to be determined not by reference to
facts that are specific to the objecting homeowner,
but by reference to the
49
common interest development as a whole.,
The Supreme Court of California also held in Nahrstedt that
recorded land use restrictions found in a common interest community's
declaration are entitled to "a presumption of validity."5 0
This
presumption, the court noted, "discourages lawsuits by owners of
individual units seeking personal exemptions from the restrictions." 5 1 In
addition, this presumption promotes stability and predictability.52
According to the court, "[i]t provides substantial assurance to prospective
condominium purchasers that they may rely with confidence on the
promises embodied in the project's recorded CC&R's. And it protects
all owners in the planned development from unanticipated increases in
association fees to fund the defense of legal challenges to recorded
restrictions. 5 3 Applying this reasoning to the facts of the case, the court
upheld as reasonable the pet restriction found in the condominium
project's original declaration.5 4

45. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-8-9(3) (1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354 (1982); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 89-9-17 (1972 & Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-13(d) (2003); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-36-10 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-10(1) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
46. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Viii. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Cal. 1994).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1278.
49. Id. at 1290.
50. Id. at 1288.
51. Id.
52. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1288.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1292.
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Analysis

A. DistinguishingBetween Covenants and Restrictions in a
Community's Declarationand Subsequent Enactments by the HOA
Board.
In Nahrstedt, the Supreme Court of California limited its analysis to
those covenants and restrictions found in the community's originating
documents.55 However, the court cited with apparent approval the
holdings in other jurisdictions, distinguishing between covenants and
restrictions found in a community's originating documents and those
subsequently promulgated by the HOA.56 Accordingly, it appeared until
recently 57 that California would recognize this distinction, becoming one
of a number of jurisdictions 58 to espouse the reasoning originally invoked
by the Florida
District Court of Appeals in Hidden HarbourEstates, Inc.
59
v. Basso.

Basso involved a dispute between a mobile home condominium
association and the Bassos, who were owners of one of the mobile home
units. 60 The Bassos sought permission by the association to drill a
shallow well on their property. 6' Despite evidence that the well would
not affect the condominium water supply, the association board denied
the request. 62 When the Bassos went forward with plans to drill the well,
63
the association board sought an injunction through the Florida courts.

On appeal from the trial court's denial of injunctive relief, the Florida
District Court of Appeals distinguished between restrictions found in the
declaration, and those "promulgated by the association's board of
directors or the refusal of the board of directors to allow a particular use
when the board is invested with the power to grant or deny a particular
use." 64

According to the court, restrictions found in the original

declaration are "clothed with a very strong presumption of validity,

65

55. See Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Ass'n, 980 P.2d
940, 949 (Cal. 1999); Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Ass'n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223,
1232 (Cal. 2004).
56.

Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1283-84; see also Terifaj, 90 P.3d at 1232.

57. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Noble v. Murphy, 612 NE.2d 266, 270 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); Apple
II Condo. Ass'n v. Worth Bank & Trust Co., 659 N.E.2d 93, 98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
59. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 638.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 639.
Basso, 393 So. 2d at 639.
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reasoning that "[s]uch restrictions are very much in the nature of
covenants running with the land and they will not be invalidated absent a
showing that they are wholly arbitrary in their application, in violation of
public policy, or that they abrogate some fundamental constitutional
right." 66 Under this standard, even restrictions with "a certain
degree of
' 67
unreasonableness" might "yet withstand attack in the courts.
The court held, however, that subsequently promulgated restrictions
by the association's board must satisfy the reasonableness requirement.6 8
The court noted that under this standard, "the board is required to enact
rules and make decisions that are reasonably related to the promotion of
health, happiness and peace of mind of the unit owners., 69 Applying the
reasonableness standard to the facts of the case, the court upheld the trial
court's decision to deny the association an injunction, noting that "where
the decision to allow a particular use is within the discretion of the board,
the board must allow the use unless the use is demonstrably antagonistic
to the legitimate objectives of the condominium association, i.e., the
70
health, happiness and peace of mind of the individual unit owners.,
Although the approach taken by the Florida District Court of
Appeals in Basso is arguably more deferential to an HOA board's
decisions than the general application of the reasonableness standard
used in Nahrstedt, the Basso analysis recognizes an important distinction
between covenants and restrictions in a community's original declaration
and subsequent enactments by an HOA board.7'
This approach
acknowledges that too much flexibility vested in an HOA board may
lead to unpredictable and inequitable results. While those who purchase
units in a common interest community should be aware that the HOA
board may be empowered to make decisions regarding the use of
individually owned property, such power must be limited to protect
homeowners' legitimate expectations.
Accordingly, courts and
legislatures should require that such decisions by the HOA board be
reasonable, with the burden of proving the reasonableness of the decision
resting with the HOA board.
The HOA board should, however, be afforded greater flexibility in
making decisions regarding the common areas within the community,
such as roads, hallways, and recreation areas. Because these decisions
will generally have a less significant impact on a homeowner's
individual expectations, and will usually impact members of the
66. Id. at 639-40.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 640.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Basso, 393 So. 2d at 639.
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community equally, the burden of proving their unreasonableness should

rest with the challenging homeowner(s).
B.

Retroactive Enforcement of Covenants and Restrictions Against
PriorPurchasers

Some courts have recognized a distinction between covenants and
restrictions adopted prior to a homeowner's purchase and those enacted
by the HOA subsequent to the purchase of the homeowner's unit. For
instance, in Noble v. Murphy,72 the Appeals Court of Massachusetts

recognized "that a somewhat different standard of review may be
implicated where ...a restriction is promulgated after the owner who is
in violation of the rule acquires his unit.",73 Other jurisdictions have
rejected this reasoning altogether. In Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners
Association v. Terifaj,74 the Supreme Court of California held that
"subsequently promulgated and recorded use restrictions are entitled to
the same judicial deference accorded covenants and restrictions in
original declarations; that is, they are presumptively valid, and 75the
burden of proving otherwise rests upon the challenging homeowner.,
Terifaj involved a no-pet restriction, which was adopted and
recorded in the community's amended declaration after the condominium
owner had purchased her unit.76 Although the California Supreme Court
had previously suggested in Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium
Association, Inc.77 that it "would not necessarily apply the same
deferential standard to subsequently enacted use restrictions,, 78 the court
79
found in Terifaj that the statutory language of the Davis-Stirling Act
72.

Noble v. Murphy, 612 N.E.2d 266, 270 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).

73.

Id.

74.

Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Ass'n. v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1232-33 (Cal.

2004).
75. Id. Note that the judicial standard of review in California is the reasonableness
standard, both for covenants and restrictions in the original declaration, and those
subsequently adopted. Id. at 1231. The issue in Terifaj, then, was whether subsequently
adopted restrictions should be afforded a presumption of validity similar to covenants and
restrictions found in the original declaration or whether the burden of proof should rest
with the HOA. See id.
76. Terifaj, 90 P.3d at 1225-26.
77. See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 878 P.2d 1275, 1283-84 (Ca.
1994).
78. Terifaj, 90 P.3d at 1232.
79. Section 1355(b) of the Davis-Stirling Act provides:
Except to the extent that a declaration provides by its express terms that it is not
amendable, in whole or in part, a declaration which fails to include provisions
permitting its amendment at all times during its existence may be amended at
any time. For purposes of this subdivision, an amendment is only effective
after (1) the proposed amendment has been distributed to all of the owners of
separate interests in the common interest development by first-class mail
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was controlling.8 ° Since the act provided for the amendment of a
community's declaration without exempting prior purchasers, the court
reasoned that any duly adopted amendment must be effective against all
homeowners. 8'
The Supreme Court of California's approach in Terifaj failed to
recognize a distinction between the amendment of previously established
regulations and the adoption of entirely new covenants and restrictions.
Without more, a provision in a community's declaration establishing
amendment procedures does not provide adequate notice to a purchaser
that they may be subjected to wholly new burdens and restrictions after
purchase.8 2
Because a community's declaration constitutes the
instrument by which covenants and use restrictions are applied to
individual property, interpretation of such an instrument should instead
be applied in accordance with the long-standing principle that doubts and
ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of
property.8 3 Accordingly, absent an express provision authorizing the
HOA to adopt new affirmative covenants or use restrictions, courts
should not extend this power by implication. To do so can result in harsh
deprivations of homeowners' vested property interests, a point illustrated
by some of the cases addressing post-purchase enactments by the HOA.84
Despite such results, courts continue to be sharply divided regarding
the enforceability of amendments against prior purchasers. 85 This
86
division extends to affirmative covenants as well as use restrictions.
Inasmuch as courts have analyzed these two categories separately, it is
postage prepaid or personal delivery not less than 15 days and not more than 60
days prior to any approval being solicited; (2) the approval of owners
representing more than 50 percent, or any higher percentage required by the
declaration for the approval of an amendment to the declaration, of the separate
interests in the common interest development has been given, and that fact has
been certified in a writing, executed and acknowledged by an officer of the
association; and (3) the amendment has been recorded in each county in which
a portion of the common interest development is located. A copy of any
amendment adopted pursuant to this subdivision shall be distributed by first-

class mail postage prepaid or personal delivery to all of the owners of separate
interest immediately upon its recordation.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1355 (1982 & Supp. 2006).
80. Terifaj, 90 P.3d at 1233. Referring to Section 1355(b) of the Davis-Stirling Act,
the court insisted that "[pllainly read, any amendment duly adopted under this

subdivision is effective against all homeowners, irrespective of when the owner acquired
title to the separate interest or whether the homeowner voted for the amendment." Id. at
1228.
81. Id.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See infra text accompanying note 107.
See Hines v. Heisler, 439 So. 2d 4, 5 (Ala. 1983).
See infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 87-123 and accompanying text.

86.

See id.
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necessary to present their arguments and analysis according to this
framework.
1.

Use Restrictions

In Terifaj, the Supreme Court of California regarded use restrictions
adopted subsequent to a community's original declaration as
presumptively valid, regardless of when the homeowner purchased the
property. 7 Most courts that have addressed the issue of retroactive
enforcement of use restrictions against prior purchasers have taken a
similar approach. 8 For example, in Woodside Village Condominium
Association, Inc. v. Jahren,89 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a
leasing restriction as valid against two condominium owners who had
purchased their units prior to the adoption of the restriction, reasoning
that the condominium owners "were on notice that the unique form of
ownership they acquired when they purchased their units ... was subject
to change through the amendment process, and that they would be bound
by properly adopted amendments." 90
In Jahren, the two affected condominium owners each purchased
multiple units specifically for the purpose of leasing them. 9' One of
these owners had been leasing these condominiums for eighteen years
before the declaration was amended. 92 At the time of purchase, leasing
was permitted by the original declaration, which specified that a
condominium could be leased "without prior approval, for any period of
one (1) year or less, and [could] be leased by successive leases for
periods in excess of one (1) year without the approval of the Board of
Directors of the Association. '' 93 Because some of the other owners
became concerned that the occupation of condominium units by non-

87.

Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Ass'n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1232-33 (Cal.

2004).
88. See Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass'n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 459-460 (Fla.
2002); Hill v. Fontaine Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 334 S.E.2d 690, 691 (Ga. 1985); Apple II
Condo. Ass'n v. Worth Bank & Trust Co., 659 N.E.2d 93, 97 (111. App. Ct. 1995)
(holding that "[i]n the absence of a provision either in the Amendment or in the original

Declaration, condominium owners do not have vested rights in the status quo ante.");
Breezy Point Holiday Harbor Lodge-Beachside Apartment Owners' Ass'n v. B.P. P'ship,

531 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (in dicta); McElveen-Hunter v. Fountain
Manor Ass'n, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 435, 436 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), ajfd, 399 S.E.2d 112, 112
(N.C. 1991); Shorewood West Condo. Ass'n v. Sadri, 992 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Wash.
2000); cf Burgess v. Pelkey, 738 A.2d 783, 788 (D.C. 1999).

89.
90.
91.

Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass'n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 461 (Fla. 2002).
Id.
Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass'n v. McClernan, 754 So. 2d 831, 832 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 2000).
92. Jahren, 806 So. 2d at 465 (Quince, J., specially concurring).

93.

Id. at 453.
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owners could negatively impact the community, the declaration was
amended to prohibit owners from leasing a condominium for more than
nine months of any twelve month period or leasing more than three units
at one time.94
At trial, the affected condominium owners asserted that the
amendment to the declaration was "confiscatory and deprived them of
lawful uses which were permissible at the time of purchase." 95 The
District Court agreed, holding as follows:
General classifications of restrictions contained within declarations of
condominium which apply to all owners equally and are not
arbitrarily and discriminately applied need not pass a strict scrutiny
test. We conclude, however, that amendments to declarations of
condominium that are adopted subsequent to a unit owner's purchase
and that significantly alter substantial fights that existed in unit
owners at the time of purchase do require a strict scrutiny as to
whether they have unreasonably altered existing fights. When such
an amendment is determined to be discriminatory, arbitrary or
oppressive in its application 96to any particular unit owner, it will be
held invalid as to that owner.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida quashed the district court's
decision, reasoning that "[a]lthough we believe such concerns are not
without merit, we are constrained to the view that they are better
addressed by the Legislature. 97 In a special concurrence, one justice
urged "the Legislature to seriously consider placing some restrictions on
present and/or future condominium owners' ability to alter the rights of
existing condominium owners. 98 Supporting the suggestion by the
district court, he noted that "there should at least be some type of
'escape' provision for those 'unit owners whose substantial property
to declarations adopted after they
rights are altered by amendments
99
acquire their property.'

Jahren characterizes the difficult questions and harsh results
ensuing from the enforcement of use restrictions against prior purchasers.
While the Florida Supreme Court's plea to the legislature to afford
greater protection to prior purchasers was commendable, its holding did
not adequately balance the benefits of HOA governance against the
individual property rights of community members. Common interest
communities must be viewed as neither pure conveyances of property
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.at 454.
Id.at 455.
McClernan, 754 So. 2d at 833.
Jahren,806 So. 2d at 464.

98. Id. at 465 (Quince, J., specially concurring).
99. Id.
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nor pure contractual agreements to submit to HOA governance, but a
hybrid of both characterizations. In this case, the district court's
reasoning more adequately recognized the dual nature of the common
interest community because it established limits on the power of an HOA
to disregard a property owner's legitimate expectations at the time of
purchase.
Like the district court and concurring justice in Jahren, some other
jurisdictions have recognized the potential for inequitable alterations to
the property rights of homeowners in common interest communities.
The most comprehensive protection against retroactive enforcement of
amendments was provided by the Supreme Court of North Dakota in
Breene v. Plaza Tower Association.'00 Like Jahren, Breene involved a
restriction on leasing that was adopted after the condominium owner
(Breene) purchased her unit. 0 1 At the time of purchase there was no
restriction against leasing, except a provision in the declaration which
gave the association the right of first refusal in leasing a unit. 10 2 After
Breene had purchased her unit, the association adopted an amendment to
its bylaws which substantially limited the ability of condominium owners
10 3
within the community to lease their units.
The association later passed
10 4
declaration.
the
to
similar amendments
In considering whether a use restriction in an amendment to a
condominium's declaration could be applied retroactively to prior
purchasers, the court examined the North Dakota statutory provisions
relating to condominiums. In particular, the court noted the requirement
that "[t]he owner of a project shall, prior to the conveyance of any
condominiums therein, record a declaration of restrictions relating to
such project which restrictions shall be enforceable equitable servitudes
where reasonable, and shall inure to and bind all owners of
condominiums in the project."' 0 5 The court interpreted this language to
mean that "notice of the restrictions through the recording procedures
must be given to prospective
buyers prior to the conveyance of any
10 6
unit."
condominium
Although the court acknowledged that the declaration provided for
its own amendment, it reasoned that "knowledge of the provisions for
amendment does not, without more, constitute the degree of knowledge
necessary to establish a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of the
100. Breene v. Plaza Tower Ass'n, 310 N.W.2d 730, 734 (N.D. 1981).
101. Id.at 731.
102. Id.
103. Id.at 732.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 733 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE, § 47-04.1-04).
106. Breene, 310 N.W.2d at 734.
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statutory right to notice
of a restriction prior to the purchase of a
10 7
condominium unit."'
The Supreme Court of North Dakota's approach in Breene directly
conflicts with the analysis favored by the Supreme Court of California in
Terifaj. 0 8 While the statutory language in each state may be partly
responsible for this discrepancy, the analysis in Breene is preferable
because it favors the free and unrestricted use of property. Although use
restrictions admittedly play an important role in common interest
communities,' 0 9 the Breene approach does not limit enforceability of use
restrictions which are contained in the original declaration. Accordingly,
developers and attorneys are encouraged to better define the limits of a
common interest community's interference during the early stages of the
community's development. Although this may result in a greater number
of restrictions being included in a community's original declaration, the
HOA is still empowered to relax these restrictions, or do away with them
altogether. Moreover, since this alternative is more deferential to a
property owner's expectations at the time of purchase, it better reflects
the dual nature of common interest communities.
2.

Affirmative Covenants

Disagreement concerning retroactive enforcement of amendments
107. Id. Unfortunately, other jurisdictions have been unwilling to recognize such
broad protections against retroactive enforcement of HOA amendments. For instance,
the Court of Appeals of Ohio called the reasoning in Breene "unpersuasive" in
Worthinglen Condominium Unit Owners' Association v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1275, 1279
(Ohio Ct. App. 1989), despite acknowledging similarities in the statutes of North Dakota
and Ohio. Id. The court reasoned that if a declaration provides notice to potential
purchasers that it may be amended by the HOA, "then the fact that the purchaser has not
foreseen a particular amendment is not dispositive." Id. Instead, "the validity of
condominium rules is measured by whether the rule is reasonable under the surrounding
circumstances." Id. at 1277. Despite such criticism, the Supreme Court of North Dakota
recently suggested that Breene continues to be valid law in that jurisdiction. In Riverside
Park Condominiums Unit Owners Association v. Lucas, 691 N.W.2d 862, 871 (N.D.
2005), the court adopted the language used by the Supreme Court of California in Terifaj,
holding that "[s]ubsequently promulgated and recorded use restrictions are entitled to the
same judicial deference accorded covenants and restrictions in original declarations .. "
Id. (quoting Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Ass'n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1232-33
(Cal. 2004)). However, the court distinguished pre-purchase amendments from postpurchase amendments, noting that "although Breene recognizes that restrictions in a
declaration of restrictions may be adopted after such a declaration has been recorded and
after condominium units have been conveyed, it also recognizes that restrictions adopted
after condominium units have been purchased would not be enforceable against prior
purchasers, except by acquiescence." Lucas, 691 N.W.2d at 872. Since the affected
owner in Lucas was not a prior purchaser, the court upheld the amendment in question.
Id.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
109. See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1281 (Cal. 1994).
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against prior purchasers has not been limited to use restrictions. Courts
are similarly divided on the issue of whether new affirmative covenants
should be enforceable against prior purchasers. 0 The Supreme Court of
Colorado addressed this issue in Evergreen Highlands Association v.
West."' That case involved a dispute between a lot owner and the HOA
concerning an assessment levied by the HOA. When the lot owner
(West) purchased his unit in 1986, membership in the HOA and payment
of assessments was voluntary.' 12 However, the declaration provided that
the HOA could "change or modify any one or more of said restrictions"
through a vote of seventy-five percent of the lot owners. 113
In 1995, the association voted to add an article to the community's
covenants, requiring all lot owners to be members of the association and
pay assessments.' " 4 West objected, claiming that voluntary HOA
membership and payment of assessments "positively influenced" his
decision to purchase a lot in the community.' 5 The court concluded,
however, that "the terms 'change' and 'modify,' as used in the Evergreen
Highlands covenants, are expansive enough to allow for the addition of a
new covenant."" 6 As a result, the court held that this covenant was
binding on all lot owners, even those who had purchased their property
before the amendment." 17
The Missouri Court of Appeals took the opposite view in Webb v.
Mullikin. " 8
Webb involved an amendment requiring community
members to pay a fifty-dollar assessment per year to provide for the
maintenance of a private swimming and tennis club located adjacent to
the community.' 19 The community's original declaration did not require
lot owners to join the club, though they were eligible to do so.' 20 The
club had been in operation for several years, supporting itself with fees
paid by club members, including non-residents.' 2'
Although the
community's original declaration included a modification clause which
permitted amendments by a majority vote, 2 2 the Missouri Court of
Appeals interpreted the phrase "'may amend these restrictions' as
permitting a majority of lot owners to change existing covenants but not
110.
111.
112.
113.

Evergreen Highlands Ass'n v. West, 73 P.3d 1,4-6 (Colo. 2003).
Id. at3.
Id.
Id. at 2.

114.

Id. at 3.

115. Id.
116.

Evergreen Highlands, 73 P.3d at 3-4.

117. Id.
118.

Webb v. Mullikin, 142 S.W.3d 822, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 824-25.
Id.at 824.
Id.
Id. at 823.
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to add new 23or different covenants, as is the case with the amended
agreement."1
When viewed together, Evergreen Highlands and Webb
demonstrate that as with use restrictions, the adoption of new affirmative
covenants in a common interest community can substantially alter a prior
purchaser's existing rights, at times trampling the property owner's
legitimate expectations at the time of purchase. In order to enhance the
stability and predictability of covenants in the common interest
community, the Webb approach should be adopted by courts addressing
this issue. Moreover, state legislatures should offer greater protection for
homeowners by enacting laws prohibiting HOAs from burdening
individually owned property with entirely new covenants and use
restrictions. Where no such statutory protection exists, courts should
resolve ambiguities in a community's governing documents in favor of
the free and unrestricted use of property.
C. PromotingStability by Limiting the Enforceabilityof Covenants and
Restrictions to Subsequent Purchasers.
In Terifaj, the Supreme Court of California argued that "[t]o allow a
declaration to be amended but limit its applicability to subsequent
purchasers would make little sense,"' 124 because covenants and
restrictions must be "uniformly applied and burden or benefit all interests
evenly."' 125 Although this uniformity is desirable, it should not take
priority over a homeowner's existing rights and legitimate expectations.
By analogy, this principle is supported through
the application of the
26
non-conforming use doctrine in zoning law. 1
123. Id. at 827.
124. Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Ass'n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1228 (Cal.
2004).
125. Id.
126. In a concurring opinion of Worthinglen Condo. Unit Owners' Ass 'n v. Brown,
566 N.E.2d 1275, 1280 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), Judge Whiteside drew an analogy between
community association law and zoning law, stating as follows:
Likewise, I cannot concur in the statement in the majority opinion that we
cannot 'derive a solution by comparison to real estate or zoning law.' First, it
is solely real estate law issues that confront us; an analogy would be to deed
restrictions. Second, zoning law is directly analogous and we are remiss if we
fail to consider the real estate law issues before us in light of the existing law
pertaining to use restrictions, namely, deed restrictions and zoning. The test for
both is the test adopted in the majority opinion, namely, reasonableness. Even
the nonconforming-use doctrine of zoning is a rule of reasonableness, it being
unreasonable to prohibit a use which is in existence because of the economic
hardship imposed. Additionally, the analogy to nonconforming-use principles
is as about as close as any analogy can be. A legislative body (the unit owners'
association in this instance) has previously adopted use restrictions and now
changes them to make "illegal" a use that was previously permitted, about as
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The Supreme Court of California further reasoned in Terifaj that
unequal application to all community members would "undermine the
stability of the community, rather than promote stability as covenants
and restrictions are intended to do."'' 27 This argument recognizes the
importance of stability within a common interest community while
simultaneously undermining the source of such stability in the law of
property. 28 When individual sticks in a homeowner's bundle of rights
can be taken away by the vote of the HOA general membership, the
extent and value of a homeowner's rights are perpetually uncertain. Of
course, a certain degree of discretion must be afforded an HOA in the
furtherance of its legitimate objectives. However, this discretion should
not be extended to permit the HOA to enforce entirely new use
restrictions and affirmative covenants against prior purchasers, except in
cases where the homeowner acquiesces to the restriction or covenant.
Instead, where an amendment substantially alters existing rights of
community members through the implementation of restrictions and
covenants, such covenants and restrictions should be unenforceable
against prior purchasers.
Under this proposed approach, an HOA would still be empowered
to modify or suspend current use restrictions and affirmative
covenants,129 enforcing such changes against prior purchasers, so long as
the amendment does not amount to a new covenant or restriction. By
application, such a rule would promote greater stability within a common
interest community. First, the original declaration of a common interest
community would play a greater role in defining the character of the
community. As such, developers and attorneys would have greater
incentive to draft a community's originating documents more carefully,
and in some cases more rigidly. Moreover, the market would have
greater influence on the development of common interest communities.
For instance, those who are attracted to common interest communities
for their ability to maintain high property values would be more likely to
select communities with stricter covenants and restrictions. As a result,
such communities would be more likely to attract purchasers with
common interests. In addition, the character of the community and its
CC&Rs would be more predictable, resulting in fewer lawsuits. Not

close as any analogy can be.

Id.
127. Terifaj, 90 P.3d at 1228.
128. The Supreme Court of California's argument favors the stability of property
values and the uniformity of application of covenants and restrictions to all members of
the community. However, it fails to address the importance of stable and predictable
restrictions and covenants burdening a homeowner's property.
129. See supra text accompanying note 123.
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only would homeowners have greater certainty concerning their rights,
but HOA boards would be less likely to pursue restrictions and covenants
that unreasonably target a particular minority of homeowners.
IV.

Conclusion

In the case of the homeowners association, less is more. Less
flexibility in amendment procedures will lead to more stability and a
better sense of community. It will also make it more difficult for an
HOA to substantially alter existing rights of homeowners. Accordingly,
courts and legislatures should adopt a reasonableness standard for postdeclaration enactments by an HOA board and subsequent amendments
adopted by the HOA general membership. When the action or
amendment concerns individually owned property, the burden of proving
its reasonableness should rest with the HOA. However, when the action
or amendment involves common areas within the community, the burden
of proving its unreasonableness should rest with the challenging
homeowner.
While the reasonableness doctrine offers some protection to existing
owners within a common interest community, it does not sufficiently
protect them from substantial alterations to existing property rights.
Accordingly, legislatures should enact laws prohibiting HOAs from
burdening individually owned property with entirely new covenants and
use restrictions. Where no such statutory protection exists, courts should
resolve ambiguities and uncertainties in favor of the free and unrestricted
use of property. This approach recognizes not only the HOA's power to
govern a common interest community, but also the vested rights of
individual property owners within that community.
Finding this
"middle-ground" is the surest way to protect the interests of individuals
within a community without overlooking the purposes for which the
community was established.

